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1940] COMMENTS
RES JUDICATA-"MATTERS WHICH MIGHT HAVE
BEEN PLEADED"
LOUISIANA CIVIL CODE OF 1870:
ART. 2286. The authority of the thing adjudged takes place
only with respect to what was the object of the judgment. The
thing demanded must be the same; the demand must be
founded on the same cause of action; the demand must be
between the same parties, and formed by them against each
other in the same quality.
In the recent case of Hope v. Madison* the Louisiana Su-
preme Court was again confronted with one of the most serious
conflicts in Louisiana jurisprudence: that caused by the intro-
duction into our law of the common law maxim, that "an ad-
judication is final and conclusive not only as to the matter ac-
tually determined, but as to every other matter which the parties
might have litigated and have had decided as incident to or
essentially connected with the subject matter of the litigation, and
every matter coming within the legitimate purview of the ori-
ginal action, both in respect to matters of claim and of defense."'
This rule, which was introduced into Louisiana early in our his-
tory,2 has repeatedly been both affirmed and disaffirmed, the
court finding ample authority for either position in the two dis-
tinct lines of cases.3 The court has said that our concept of res
* No. 35496 of the docket, decided Jan. 9, 1940, as yet unreported; rehear-
ing denied Feb. 5, 1940.
1. 2 Freeman, Judgments (5 ed. 1925) 1421-1422, § 674.
2. E.g., see McMicken v. Morgan, 9 La. Ann. 208, 209 (1854); Bowman v.
McElroy & Bradford, 15 La. Ann. 663, 664 (1860).
3. This conflict was recognized by the Supreme Court in Succession of
Marinoni, 183 La. 776, 790-791, 164 So. 797, 802 (1935):
"It is stated in the original opinion in the present case, however, that:
'The rule is that where one claims a certain thing or seeks recognition of
certain rights, he must assert all his pretensions, all his titles, in one suit.
A plea of res adjudicata based on a former judgment between the parties
on the same subject matter bars a second suit for the same purpose not
only as to the titles specifically set up in the former suit, but as to those
which might have been plead as well. A plaintiff can not withhold grounds
for relief which he should have asserted and then, when he loses, file an-
other suit setting forth the facts originally alleged and those withheld.
Brooks v. Magee, 126 La. 388, 52 So. 551; Rareshide v. Enterprise Ginning &
Mfg. Co., 43 La. Ann. 820, 9 So. 642.'
"The doctrine above announced is too broadly stated, and Is not in har-
mony with the latest decisions of this court on this point.
"In Tennent v. Caffery, 163 La. 976, 990, 113 So. 167, 172, this court said:
"The doctrine of the common-law courts that res judicata includes not only
everything pleaded in a cause, but even that which might have been pleaded,
does not obtain generaZly under our system,"' citing Woodcock v. Baldwin,
110 La. 270, 275, 34 So. 440, 441. (Italics ours.)"
The court was too optimistic in suggesting that recent decisions have been
uniform; one of the most extreme dicta to be found on this point appears
In Exchange Nat. Bank v. Holoman Bros., 177 La. 537, 542, 148 So. 702, 703
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judicata is derived from the French,4 and has held that this
doctrine is much more limited in Louisiana than in the common
law;5 but it has also decided cases relying principally or entirely
on common law authorities,6 and has stated rules more stringent
than those attainable even under the common law.7
It is the purpose of this comment to discuss the Louisiana
decisions relating to res judicata when the matter advanced in
the second suit might have been, but was not, litigated in a prior
action. Because of limitations of space, it will be necessary to
restrict the scope of this inquiry by assuming that the first suit
resulted in a final and valid judgment of a competent court; that
the two suits were between the same parties, appearing in the
same qualities; that the object or thing demanded in the two
suits was the same; and that the party knew of the matter which
he failed to urge. Thus the question will be restricted, insofar
as possible, to the identity of cause of action. This problem offers
the greatest difficulties and gives rise to most of the differences
between the common law and the French.
I. COMMON LAW
The common law of res judicata has frequently been mis-
interpreted even in those Louisiana cases which purport to follow
it. The maxim, that a judgment is conclusive upon every matter
which the parties might have pleaded, is understood at common
law to mean that the judgment is conclusive upon the issues
tendered, and upon everything which might have been urged to
support or defeat those issues.8 Furthermore, the plaintiff must
(1933). A discussion of this and other Louisiana cases will appear in the con-
cluding installment of this Comment, in a forthcoming issue of the LOUISIANA
LAw REvIEw.
4. See State v. American Sugar Refining Co., 108 La. 603, 604, 32 So. 965
(1902); Hope v. Madison, as yet unreported (La. 1940).
5. See Woodcock v. Baldwin, 110 La. 270, 275, 34 So. 440, 441 (1902); Ten-
nent v. Caffery, 163 La. 976, 989, 113 So. 167, 172 (1927). See note 3, supra.
6. E.g., Heroman v. Louisiana Institute of Deaf and Dumb, 34 La. Ann.
805 (1882); Harvin v. Blackman, 121 La. 431, 46 So. 525 (1908); P. Olivier &
Sons v. Board of Com'rs, 181 La. 802, 160 So. 419 (1935).
7. See Exchange Nat. Bank v. Holoman Bros., 177 La. 537, 542, 148 So.
702, 703 (1933).
8. "Even in those cases to which It is applicable, the general expression,
... that a judgment is conclusive of every matter which the parties might
have litigated in the action, is misleading. What is really meant by this ex-
pression is, that a judgment is conclusive upon the issues made or tendered
and, so far as those issues are concerned, of everything which might have
been urged for or against them .... The plaintiff must support all the issues
necessary to maintain his cause of action. The defendant must bring forward
all the defenses which he has to the cause of action asserted in the plaintiff's
pleadings at the time they were filed. In this sense is it true that a judgment
is conclusive of every matter which might have been litigated and decided In
the action. But the plaintiff is under no obligation to tender issues not neces-




bring forward all the issues necessary to support his cause of
action, and the defendant is under a similar duty to produce all
his defenses to that cause of action, for the judgment will be a
final adjudication of all their rights thereunder."
But if the suit is upon a different cause of action, even
though it arose out of the same transaction and might have been
joined in the first suit, the prior judgment will not be a complete
bar to the second suit;10 it can be conclusive only as to a fact,
matter, or issue which was actually adjudicated in the first suit,
either expressly or by necessary implication."
Thus, "Where the second suit is upon the same cause of ac-
tion set up in the first suit, an estoppel by judgment [res judicata
as a bar] arises with respect to every matter offered or received
in evidence, or which might have been offered, to sustain or de-
feat the claim in controversy; but, where the second suit is upon
a different claim or demand, the prior judgment operates as an
estoppel only as to matters in issue or points controverted and
actually determined in the original suit."12 To avoid confusion,
the former is usually referred to as "res judicata" and the latter
as "estoppel by judgment."'13 Res judicata, as thus restricted, is
a complete bar to a second action, 4 while estoppel by judgment
merely precludes the parties from contesting the matter, fact, or
issue which was decided in the prior suit.15
Since the above distinction is based upon the identity of the
9. 2 Black, Judgments (2 ed. 1902) 767-769, § 506; 2 Freeman, Judgments
1425-1429, § 676. Wildman v. Wildman, 70 Conn. 700, 41 Atl. 1 (1898), Hamers-
ley, J., dissenting on the ground that the two causes of action were different.
10. "A prior judgment can operate as a complete bar to a second action
only on the theory that it is a conclusive adjudication or an absolute estop-
pel as to every matter that might be urged in support of the latter. Except
in those cases involving the doctrine of election of remedies [§ 684] or of
Inconsistent positions [§§ 631 and 696], or in some cases involving the effect
of a former recovery [§ 588 et seq.], this obviously could only be true where
the cause of action or claim in both cases is identical." 2 Freeman, Judg-
ments 1427, § 676.
Id. at 1242, § 588. International & G. N. Ry. Co. v. Concrete Inv. Co., 201
S.W. 718 (Tex. Civ. App. 1917).
11. 2 Black, Judgments 767-769, § 506; 2 Freeman, Judgments 1429-1432,
§ 677. Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351, 24 L.Ed. 195 (1876).
12. Troxell v. Delaware, Lackawanna & Western R. R. Co., 227 U.S. 434,
440, 33 S.Ct. 274, 276, 57 L.Ed. 586, 590 (1913).
13. See Kelliher v. Stone & Webster, 75 F. (2d) 331, 333 (C.C.A. 5th, 1935).
This terminology is not uniformly followed by the courts, but is adopted by
most of the writers.
14. 2 Black, Judgments 767-769, § 506; 2 Freeman, Judgments 1425-1429,
§ 676.
15. 2 Black, Judgments 767, 769, § 506; 2 Freeman, Judgments 1429-1432,
§ 677. But see Comment (1926) 35 Yale L. J. 607, n. 1, which suggests that
there is no difference between the operation of the judgment as a "bar" and
as an "estoppel," since it will "bar" the second suit whenever a point deter-
mined by it is decisive of the second action.
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cause of action in the two suits, it becomes a matter of primary
importance to determine what constitutes the cause of action.
There is no exact rule, since each case must depend largely upon
its peculiar circumstances, 6 but "cause of action" has been de-
fined as the facts which establish the existence of a primary right
in the plaintiff, and the violation of that right by some act or
omission on the part of the defendant. 7 Separate causes of action
may arise from the same subject matter.18
Where the cause of action is the same, however, differences
in the grounds of action will not prevent the former judgment's
operating as a bar. A single cause of action may be based on
several grounds, 20 and a plaintiff who fails to urge all the grounds
at his disposal is thereafter precluded from litigating those
omitted, as fully as though he had advanced them, but had failed
to introduce evidence in support of them or to convince the court
of their merits.2 1 Under the common law, the right to have a deed
or contract set aside is regarded as a single cause of action, while
fraud, incapacity, or undue influence constitute merely the
grounds which give rise thereto.2
In addition to identity of the cause of action, res judicata (in
the stricter sense) requires identity in the thing sued for, identity
of persons and of parties to the action, and identity of the quality
in which these persons appear. 2 This is substantially what Article
16. 2 Freeman, Judgments 1433, § 678. See Oregon Ry. Co. v. Oregon Ry.
& Nay. Co., 28 Fed. 505, 511 (C.C.D. Ore., 1886); Sullivan v. Nitrate Producers'
B.S. Co., 262 Fed. 371, 373 (C.C.A. 2nd, 1919).
"The best and most invarible test as to whether a former judgment Is
a bar is to inquire whether the same evidence will sustain both the present
and the former action. . . . Whatever be the form of action, the issue is
deemed the same whenever it may in both actions be supported by sub-
stantially the same evidence. If so supported, a judgment in one action is
conclusive upon the same issue in any other suit, though the cause of action
is different....
"On the other hand, if different proofs are required to sustain two ac-
tions, a judgment In one of them is no bar to the other. If the evidence in
a second suit between the same parties is sufficient to entitle plaintiff to a
recovery, his right cannot be defeated by showing any judgment against
him in any action where the evidence in the present suit could not, if offered,
have altered the result." 2 Freeman, Judgments 1447-1449, § 687.
17. 2 Freeman, Judgments 1433, § 678.
18. 2 Freeman, Judgments 1252-1254, 1434-1436, §§ 594, 679. Baumhoff v.
St. Louis & K.R. Co., 205 Mo. 248, 104 S.W. 5, 120 Am. St. Rep. 745 (1907).
19. 2 Freeman, Judgments 1437-1440, § 681. Woolverton v. Baker, 98 Cal.
628, 33 Pac. 731 (1893).
20. Compare the French distinction between cause and means, infra p. 355.
21. 2 Freeman, Judgments 1437-1440, § 681. Woolverton v. Baker, 98 Cal.
628, 33 Pac. 731 (1893).
22. 2 Freeman, Judgments 1438, § 681. Wildman v. Wildman, 70 Conn. 700,
41 Atl. 1 (1898). See Hein v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 172 Fed. 524 (1909).
Contrast the French view on actions of nullity, infra pp. 356-359.
23. 2 Black, Judgments 927, § 610; 3 Bouvier's Law Dictionary (8 ed.
1914) 2910, Res Judicata. For a collection of cases on this point, see 34 C.J.
(1924) 752, n. 33.
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2286 of the Louisiana Civil Code states as the limitations on "the
authority of the thing adjudged,"'24 which no doubt explains in
part the willingness of Louisiana courts to adopt the common
law doctrine in its entirety. But substantially the same requisites
are exacted by the French code 2 and authors,' with radically
different results.2 7 It is apparent that the doctrines of res judicata
are, to a large degree, a controversy of definitions.
A considerable part of the breadth of res judicata in the com-
mon law may be traced to the doctrine of estoppel by judgment.
The identity of persons and qualities is necessarily required for
the operation of this estoppel, as well as for the operation of res
judicata as a bar; but the identity in the thing sued for and the
identity of cause of action are replaced, for the purposes of the
estoppel, by the single requirement of identity of issues.2 8 The
issue must actually have been in controversy in the prior suit,
expressly or by necessary implication; 29 and the estoppel does
not apply to issues which entered into the first suit only inci-
dentally or collaterally, or which can be deduced from the form
or character of the first judgment only by a process of argument
and influence.2 0 This rule, from its statement, would not appear
24. Succession of Durnford, 1 La. Ann. 92 (1846); State v. Jumel, 30 Ia.
Ann. 861 (1878).
25. Art. 1351, French Civil Code. For text, see infra, note 35.
26. 5 Toullier, Le Droit Civil Frangais (ed. 1833) 264, no 143. Most of the
French writers state these requirements as only three indentities. that of
"persons" being understood to include "in the same qualities." 12 Aubry et
Rau, Cours de Droit Civil Francais (5 ed. 1922) 406, § 769 II; 3 Baudry-
Lacantinerie et Barde, Trait6 Thorique et Pratique de Droit Civil (2 ed.
1905) 958, no 2674; Bonnier, Trait6 Th~orique et Pratique des Preuves en
Droit Civil et en Droit Criminel (2 ed. 1852) 709, no 761; 8 Dalloz, Repertoire
de Legislation de Doctrine et de Jurisprudence (1847) 251, Chose Jug~e no
103; 3 Garsonnet et Cdzar-Bru, Trait6 Th6orique et Pratique de Procedure
Civile et Commerciale (3 ed. 1913) 428, no 710; 8 Huc, Commentaire Th~orique
et Pratique du Code Civil (1895) 397, no 311; 7 Larombi~re, Th~orie et Prati-
que des Obligations (Nouvelle ed. 1885) 51, no 32; 20 Laurent, Principes de
Droit Civil Frangais (2 ed. 1876) 52, no 38; 5 Marcad6, Explication Th~orique
et Pratique du Code Civil (7 ed. 1873) 164-165; 2 Planiol, Trait6 Elmentaire
de Droit Civil (11 ed. 1937) 22, no 54 bis 3o; 7 Planiol et Ripert, Trait6 Prati-
que de Droit Civil Frangais (1931) 890-891, no 1553; 2 Pothier, Oeuvres (2 ed.
1861) 470, no 888.
The same identities were required by Roman law. 7 Larombi~re, loc. cit.;
2 Pothier, loc. cit.
"Ces r~gles en elles-mdmes sont incontestables, car elles ne sont que
Z'expression de la raison universelle. Mais leur application soul~ve quelque-
lois des difficultds assez graves." Bonnier, loc. cit.
(Translation) "These rules in themselves are incontestable, for they are
but the expression of universal reason. But their application often raises
rather grave difficulties."
27. See infra, p. 353 et seq.
28. 2 Black, Judgments 928, § 610.
29. 2 Freeman, Judgments 1429-1430, § 677. Prewitt v. Wilborn, 184 Ky.
638, 212 S.W. 442 (1919).
30. 2 Black, Judgments 928-932, § § 610-612.
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to lead to results widely at variance with the French; 81 but
"issue," as used in this connection, is understood quite broadly:
If title to land was contested on any ground in the prior action,
it is an issue finally concluded by the first judgment, which is
an estoppel as to everything which was or might have been urged
for or against the issue of title.8 2 Similarly, whenever the validity
of a contract, deed, or other written instrument is in issue, every
matter either of law or fact which can be urged for or against
its validity must be brought forward in a single suit;8 and if the
31. See infra, p. 353 et seq.
32. 2 Freeman, Judgments 1812-1815, § 856, in which certain qualifications
to this rule, depending upon the nature of the first action, are set forth.
"Take this illustration: Suppose a party brings suit to recover the pos-
session of real estate, and alleges in his complaint that he is owner by virtue
of a patent from the government. After a judgment against him, would he
be permitted to maintain a second action, alleging that he was owner by
virtue of a certain tax proceedings, or by virtue of a judicial sale? . . . In
both of such actions plaintiff's primary right, that of possession based on
ownership, would be the same, the only difference being in the grounds of
recovery. All the grounds of recovery, all the bases of the plaintiff's title,
must be presented in the first action, or they are lost to him forever ... "
Patterson v. Wold, 33 Fed. 791, 793 (C.C.D. Minn., 1888). Contrast the result
suggested here with Laurent's answer to a similar hypothesis, that each
"juridical fact which is the basis of the right of ownership claimed" [i.e.,
the patent and each sale individually] is a separate cause, hence may be
made the basis of a distinct suit without being affected by a prior judgment
on any of the others. 20 Laurent, op. cit. supra note 26, at 82, no 64.
Similarly, contrast the following:
"A judgment determining title is as conclusive against title by limitation
or adverse possession as against title by deed." 2 Freeman, Judgments 1815,
§ 856.
". . .Si un tribunal vous condamne 4 restituer l'immeuble revendiqud
contre vous, attendu que vous ne produisez aucun titre de propridtd, et que,
si vous aviez une possession utile, vous n'eussiez pas manqud d'invoquer la
prescription, vous serez admis d prouver dans une autre instance la fausetd
do ce dernier motif qui n'est qu'une opinion, et 4 plaider que vous avez de cot
immeuble une possession sufflsante pour en prescrire la propridtd."1 3 Gar-
sonnet et Cdzar-Bru, op. cit. supra note 26, at 411, no 703.
(Translation) "... If a court orders you to return the Immovable reven-
dicated against you, on the grounds that you have not produced any title of
ownership, and that, if you had had a useful possession, you would not have
failed to Invoke prescription, you will be allowed to prove, in another in-
stance, the falsity of this last reason for the decision, which is no more
than an opinion [of the court], and to plead that you have sufficient pos-
session to enable you to prescribe the ownership [of the immovable]."
33. 2 Freeman, Judgments 1881-1884, § 894. Marsh v. Lott, 156 Cal. 643,
105 Pac. 968 (1910). See Hein v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 172 Fed. 524,
526 (C.C.N.D. Ill., 1909).
The right to have an Instrument set aside is also said to be a single cause
of action, hence res judicata (as opposed to estoppel by judgment) would
apply. See supra, text p. 350 and note 22. The cases are not clear as to which
theoretical ground is the basis of the bar or estoppel, but the result is well
established.
"A previous adjudication as to [a deed's] validity or invalidity . . . is res
judicata when It subsequently comes in question. An unsuccessful attempt
to set it aside on one ground bars a subsequent similar attack on other
grounds then existing." 2 Freeman, 1883-1884, § 894. Compare this with the
view of actions of nullity taken by Bonnier and Griolet, which has been
attacked by many of the better commentators. See infra, p. 356.
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plaintiff secures judgment on a note or contract, its genuineness
is impliedly adjudicated.84
II. THE DOCTRINE IN FRANCE
"The authority of the thing adjudged" (res judicata) in
French law is founded on Article 1351 of the French Civil Code,85
of which Article 2286 of the Louisiana code is a literal transla-
tion.88 This, in turn, was borrowed by the Code Napoleon from
Pothier,8 7 and by Pothier from the Roman jurisconsults.8
In Roman law, a distinction was drawn between real and
personal actions: In the latter, failure of the plaintiff in a suit on
one cause was no bar to a subsequent suit on another; but in a
real action, a judgment for the defendant precluded any attempt
to secure the immovable, even though the plaintiff offered to show
that the ownership was his on a different account than that urged
before.89 Two exceptions were recognized to this last rule, how-
ever: 40
1. When the title of ownership invoked in the second ac-
tion arose subsequent to the first suit; and
2. When the plaintiff has expressed the precise cause on
which he demands the immovable.' 1
Huc suggests that these same rules could be applied under
French law; but since modern French procedure (like that of
Louisiana) requires that the precise cause for which the plain-
34. 2 Freeman, Judgments 1884-1885, § 895; Greenwood Drug Co. v.
Bromania Co., 81 S.C. 516, 62 S.E. 840, 128 Am. St. Rep. 929 (1908).
35. "L'autoritd de la chose jugde n'a lieu qu'd l'gard de ce qui a lait
l'objet du jugement. It faut que la chose demandde soit la mdme; que la de-
mande soit fondde 8ur la mdme cause; que la demande soit entre lea mdmes
parties, et formde par elles et contre eles en la mime qualit6." Art. 1351,
French Civil Code.
(Translation) "The authority of the thing adjudged takes place only
with respect to what was the object of the judgment. The thing demanded
must be the same; the demand must be founded on the same cause; the
demand must be between the same parties, and formed by them against
each other In the same quality."
36. The French version of Art. 2265, La. Civil Code of 1825, differs from
the article of the French code only In punctuation.
37. 2 Pothier, op. cit. supra note 26, at 470, no 888. Cf. Provosty, J., in
State v. American Sugar Refining Co., 108 La. 603, 604, 32 So. 965 (1902).
38. Cod. L. 12, L. 13, L. 14, if, "De Except. Eei Jud." 8 Huc, op. cit. supra
note 26, at 414-415, no 326; 7 Larombire, loc. cit. supra note 26, at 51, no 32;
2 Pothier, op. cit. supra note 26, at 470, no 888. See State v. American Sugar
Refining Co., 108 La. 603, 604, 32 So. 965 (1902).
39. 8 Huc., op. cit. supra note 26, at 414, no 326; 2 Pothier, op. cit. supra
note 26, at 472-474, no 894.
40. 8 Huc, op. cit. supra note 26, at 414-415, no 326; 2 Pothier, op. cit.
supra note 26, at 474, no 895-896.
41. Huc recognizes a conflict of opinion as to the second of these excep-
tions. 8 Huc, loc. cit. supra note 26, at 415, no 326. See also 12 Aubry et Rau,
op. cit. supra note 26, at 448, n. 107, § 769.
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tiff seeks ownership of an immovable shall always be stated,
every case would fall under the exceptions. 42 Therefore a prior
judgment can never be a bar to a subsequent action for the same
immovable, if the second suit is based on a cause not urged in
the first. The other commentators agree as to this result, main-
taining that the distinction between real and personal actions no
longer obtains under the Code.48
Thus, in both real and personal actions, the question of
whether a prior judgment (between the same parties, in the
same capacities, and for the same object 44 ) is res judicata as to a
second action resolves itself into the single question, is the cause
identical? This is so obvious from the wording of the codal ar-
ticle that even the French commentators have almost attained
unanimity; 45 but in order to apply the rule, the term cause must
be defined. In this the commentators differ radically.
Disregarding the niceties of language which provoke so much
discussion among the commentators, cause may be defined as
42. 8 Huc, op. cit. supra note 26, at 415, no 326. See also 7 Larombibre, op.
cit. supra note 26, at 77-79, no 66; 2 Pothier, op. cit. supra note 26, at 474,
n. 1. Contra: Bonnier, op. cit. supra note 26, at 716-717, no 768.
43. ". . . Tous les auteurs s'accordent d dire que cette distinction, em-
pruntde au droit romain, ne regoit plus d'application dans notre droit fran-
Vais." 20 Laurent, op. cit. supra note 26, at 78, no 63.
(Translation) "... All authors agree that this distinction, borrowed from
the Roman law, Is no longer applicable in our French law."
Cf. Allard, op. cit. supra note 26, at 241 et seq.; Bonnier, op. cit. supra
note 26, at 716-717, no 768; 8 Dalloz, op. cit. supra note 26, at 290-291, no 193.
44. Because of limitations of space, these stipulations are necessary; the
principal difficulties of the doctrine of res judicata, both in French law and
Louisiana law, will be found in the identity considered here. See supra, p. 348.
The object (thing demanded) may be defined as "the immediate juridical
benefit sought." 8 Huc, op. cit. supra note 26, at 407, no 319. It is generally
required that there be the same corpus, the same quantity (if corporeal
things), or the same right (if incorporeal). 12 Aubry et Rau, op. cit. supra
note 26, at 431-432, § 769 II B; 20 Laurent, op. cit. supra note 26, at 56, no
40. Laurent suggests that the question be settled by the application of the
general principles of the thing adjudged: that the whole criterion should
be whether or not the first judge has actually decided what is submitted
in the second suit. 20 Laurent, op. cit. supra note 26, at 56-59, no 40.
45. 12 Aubry et Rau, op. cit. supra note 26, at 440, § 769; 3 Baudry-
Lacantinerie et Barde, op. cit. supra note 26, at 961, no 2679; Bonnier, op. cit.
supra note 26, at 716, no 768; 8 Dalloz, op. cit. supra note 26, 290, no 191; 8
Hue, op. cit. supra note 26, at 413, no 325; 20 Laurent, op. cit. supra note 26,
at 78, no 63; 5 Marcad6, op. cit. supra note 26, at 173; 5 Toullier, op. cit. supra
note 26, at 268-269, no 158.
But cf. 7 Planiol et Ripert, op. cit. supra note 26, at 900, no 1560, saying
that the requirement of identity of cause was taken from a fragment of Paul
which concerned only real actions; that the modern commentators have
been wrong in generalizing it; and that the requirement of this identity can
very well be abolished. To the same effect, see 2 Planiol, op. cit. supra note
26, at 24, no 54 bis 60; Planiol, however, continues with a discussion of his
views of the law under the requirement of the identity of cause, which is
recognized in both works as well established.
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"the juridical fact which constitutes the basis of the right."46 This
helps as little as any definition, but perhaps it may be clarified
by a hypothesis: A brings an unsuccessful suit against B, alleg-
ing that he is entitled to an estate in the latter's possession be-
cause B sold it to him; subsequently A sues for the same estate,
alleging that it is his by virtue of inheritance or donation. In
the first action the cause is the sale; in the second, the legacy or
donation. Failure in the first suit would, therefore, be no bar to
the second.
This appears to be the general understanding of the word;' t
at any rate, none of the commentators quarrels with the result
suggested above. As Planiol remarks, 48 little difficulty is encount-
ered when the claim has for its object a real right or a credit;
the controversies have centered upon actions in nullity, rescision,
annulment, and others of that nature.
Here the French differentiate between cause and means. As
seen above, identity of cause is necessary for a prior judgment
to constitute res judicata; but if the cause is the same in the two
suits, a difference in the means will not suffice to permit the new
action to lie.49 Means may be defined as the circumstances which
46. This is the definition given by Laurent (20 Laurent, op. cit. supra
note 26, at 80, no 63) and attributed by him to Colmet de Santerre.
Other commentators have defined "cause" as
-- "the immediate basis of the right which the party seeks to exercise."
5 Marcad6, op. cit. supra note 26, at 173.
-"the juridical or material fact which is the basis of the right claimed
or of the defense urged." 2 Planlol, op. cit. supra note 26, at 24 no 54 bis 6o;
7 Planiol et Ripert, op. cit. supra note 26, at 900, no 1560.
-"that which serves as the basis of the demand, the juridical reason or
motif on which it Is based." 8 Dalloz, op. cit. supra note 26, at 290, no 192.
-"the juridical fact which forms the direct and immediate basis of the
right or of the legal benefit of which one of the parties seeks to avail him-
self." 12 Aubry et Rau, op. cit. supra note 26, at 440, § 769.
-"the juridical fact which constitutes the legal basis of the benefit
or of the right, object of the demand." 3 Baudry-Lacantinerie et Barde, op.
cit. supra note 26, at 961, no 2679.
-"the legal basis of the right which the parties urge against each other
respectively, by action or by exception." 7 Larombi~re, op. cit. supra note
26, at 73, no 60.
--"the fact which is invoked by the plaintiff as constituting the basis
of his right." 8 Hue, loc. cit. supra note 26, at 413, no 325.
47. Few of the commentators go beyond the vague generalization of a
definition. Among those who give hypotheses such as the above, see 3 Baudry-
Lacantinerie et Barde, op. cit. supra note 26, at 961-962, no 2679; 7 Larom-
bire, op. cit. supra note 26, at 73, no 60; 20 Laurent, op. cit. supra note 26, at
80, no 63.
48. 2 Planiol, op. cit. supra note 26, at 24, no 54 bis 60. See also 7 Planiol
et Ripert, op. cit. supra note 26, at 900, no 1560.
49. 12 Aubry et Rau, op. cit. supra note 26, at 441 et seq., § 769 II C; 3
Baudry-Lacantinerie et Barde, op. cit. supra note 26, at 962-963, no 2680; 8
Hue, op. cit. supra note 26, at 421-422, no 329; 20 Laurent, op. cit. supra note
26, at 84, no 65; 5 Marcad4, op. cit. supra note 26, at 173 et seq.; 5 Toullier,
op. cit. supra note 26, at 269-270, no 161. Compare this distinction with the
common law differentiation of cause and grounds of action, supra p. 350.
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concur to constitute a cause,50 or more restrictedly as the proofs
or arguments of fact and law which serve to prove the cause.1
In general, means is any subdivision of the cause, so the broad-
ness of the concept of the former varies inversely with the
broadness of the latter. Once the commentator's view of cause
is ascertained, his definition of means is easily understood.
There are three distinct views as to what constitutes cause in
an action of nullity:
1) That the invalidity of an instrument is a single cause; and
that the vices of consent, the vices of form, the incapacities,
etc., which will establish such invalidity, are merely means.
Therefore an attack upon the instrument on the ground that it
was forged will bar a subsequent attack on the ground that
it was secured by fraud or violence, or that the person who signed
was insane or was a minor. Under this view the results attained
are comparable to those under common law doctrines.52 This
view is taken by Griolet and Bonnier,58 but is attacked by the
other authors as a confusion of cause with the object of the
demand.5
2) That the various grounds of invalidity should be grouped
into vices of consent, vices of form, the incapacities, etc.; each
of these groups constitutes a cause, the separate vices within each
category (as fraud, error, duress) constituting mere means.55
This view, the prevalent one among the older commentators, was
taken from the differentiation between proximate and distant
cause advanced by the Roman jurisconsult, Neratius. 6 He
50. 12 Aubry et Rau, loc. cit. supra note 49.
51. 3 Baudry-Lacantinerie et Barde, loc. cit. supra note 49; 8 Huc, loc.
cit. supra note 49; 20 Laurent, op. cit. supra note 26, at 82-83, no 65.
52. See supra, pp. 350, 352, and note 33.
53. Griolet, De l'Autorit6 de la Chose Jug6e (1868) 109-113.
Aubry et Rau (12 Aubry et Rau, op. cit. supra note 26, at 440, § 769 n.
86), Baudry-Lacantinerie (3 Baudry-Lacantinerie et Barde, op. cit. supra
note 26, at 965-966, no 2682), Garsonnet et C~zar-Bru (2 Garsonnet et Cdzar-
Bru, op. cit. supra note 26, at 425, no 708), and Huc (8 Huc, op. cit. supra
note 26, at 425, no 330), attribute this view also to Bonnier, citing no 876 of
his work (presumably the first edition). The second edition of Bonnier (op.
cit. supra note 26, at 716-719, no 768-772), which was the only one available
to the writer, does not seem to substantiate the statements given above; but
M. Bonnier's position is by no means clearly stated. See Marcad6's criticism,
5 Marcad6, op. cit. supra note 26, at 177-178; the footnote on pages 178-179
is to the effect that Bonnier subsequently changed his views to accord with
those of Marcad4, no 874 of Bonnier's third edition being cited.
54. 3 Baudry-Lacantinerie et Barde, loc. cit. supra note 53; 2 Garsonnet
et C~zar-Bru, loc. cit. supra note 53; 8 Huc, loc. cit. supra note 53. Cf. 5
Marcad6, loc. cit. supra note 53.
55. 12 Aubry et Rau, op. cit. supra note 26, at 441, § 769 II C; 5 Marcad6,
op. cit. supra note 26, at 173 et seq.; 5 Toullier, loc. cit. supra note 49, and
at 272-274, no 166.
56. L. 27, ff, "Do Except. Bet Jud."
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contended that only the proximate cause was necessary to res
judicata; a difference in the distant or remote causes (means)
would not prevent the prior judgment's acting as a bar.5 7 The
commentators who follow this view58 term their various groups
proximate causes, and the individual vices remote causes: Thus
an attack on the ground of fraud would preclude a subsequent
attack on the ground of error or duress, for these merely tend to
prove the same proximate cause, i.e., nullity for vices of consent;
but it would not prevent an attack on the ground of insanity,
which tends to substantiate a different proximate cause, i.e.,
nullity for incapacity.
This result is justified on the ground that public policy re-
quires that there be an end to litigation;59 the plaintiff, therefore,
is presumed to have based his demand on all the vices comprised
in that group, although he may actually have founded his suit
on only one of them. 0 Marcad6 recognizes the illogic and ar-
bitrariness of the grouping rule,61 but nevertheless adheres to
it; for this Laurent has criticized him severely.62
The rule is not only arbitrary and illogical, contends Laurent,
but is entirely unjustified;63 the theory that the plaintiff is pre-
57. 12 Aubry et Rau, op. cit. supra note 26, at 441, § 769 II C; 5 Marcad6,
loe. cit. supra note 26, at 173 et seq.; 5 Toullier, op. cit. supra note 26, at
272-273, no 165. See also 8 Daloz, op. cit. supra note 26, at 294, no 198; 8 Hue,
op. cit. supra note 26, 421-423, no 329; 20 Laurent, op. cit. supra note 26, at
78-82, no 63-64.
58. 12 Aubry et Rau, loc. cit. supra note 57; 7 Larombfbre, op. cit. supra
note 26, at 98 et seq., no 81 et seq.; 5 Marcad6, op. cit. supra note 26, at 176;
5 Toullier, op. cit. supra note 26, at 269-270, no 161.
59. 12 Aubry et Rau, op. cit. supra note 26, at 442, § 769, n. 89; 7 Larom-
blare, op. cit. supra note 26, at 99, no 81; 5 Marcad6, op. cit. supra note 26,
at 175. Cf. 20 Laurent, op. cit. supra note 26, at 96, no 73.
60. 7 Larombire, loc. cit. supra note 26, at 98 et seq., no 81 et seq.; 5
Marcad6, op. cit. supra note 26, at 175-176. Cf. 20 Laurent, op. cit. supra note
26, at 94-95, no 73.
61. 5 Marcad6, op. cit. supra note 26, at 174-175.
62. 20 Laurent, op. cit. supra note 26, at 93 et seq., no 72 et seq.
63. 20 Laurent, loc. cit. supra note 62. Cf. 3 Baudry-Lacantinerie et Barde,
op. cit. supra note 26, at 964-965, no 2681: "Mats cette distinction purement
thdorique n'est pas moins contraire au texts de Part. 1851, qui parle de la
cause en g~ndral, qu'au principe fondamental de la matidre. L'autoritd de
la chose jugde ne met obstacle d une nouvelle instance qu'autant qu'elle
porte exactement sur ce qui a td ddcid6 par un prdcddent jugement. Done,
au point de vue do la condition qui nous occupe, il faut qu'elle soit fond~e
our la mdme cause qui a fait Pobjet des conclusions des parties et our
laquelle Is juge a statud apras ddbat. Or, dana les espdces que nous avons
presentdes tout d Pheure, le Jugs n'avait pas statud sur tous lea vices de
forms dont Is testament pouvait tre entachd, ou sur tous lea vices de con-
sentement dont la convention pouvait 6tre atteinte, mais seulement sur Is
vice particulier que le parties avaient soumis d son examen. Donc rien ne
s'oppose a cs qu'il vdrifle, dans un second procds, l'existence d'un autre vice,
c'est-d-dire d'une autre cause de nullitd. Le nouveau jugement ne peut ni
contredire ni confirmer Is premier.
"Au surplus, nous devons attirer P'attention sur Ie point suivant: comme
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sumed to have based his suit on all the vices included in the
group he chose is a fiction, since if the court found one of that
group which the plaintiff had not urged, it could not render judg-
ment in his favor thereon.6 4 This fiction, and the sacrifice of the
individual to the general interest demanded by the grouping rule,
are not permissible without legislative action.65 Instead, Laurent
suggests 6 the third view:
3) That each of the vices is a separate cause, and therefore
failure of the plaintiff in an attack on the ground of fraud will
not bar a subsequent attack on the grounds of error or duress, or
any other vice.6 7 This view has been adopted by practically all
the modern commentators. 8
le juge a le pouvoir de supplder d'office les simple& moyens, la nullitd, si Pon
admet la doctrine de nos adversaires, peut dtre prononce d raison d'un vice
que la partie n'a pas fait valoir. Par example, si elle a damandd V'annuZation
d'un contrat pour cause de dol, le tribunal peut annuler ce contrat pour cause
de violence.
"Ainsi Ze systdme des groupes a le trds grave ddfaut de ddnaturer la
demands en lut attribuant un caractdre gdndral qu'elle n'a pas. Le groupe-
ment des vices ne repose, d'ailleurs, sur aucun principe. I1 est purement
arbitraire."
(Translation) "But this purely theoretical distinction is no less contrary
to the text of article 1351, which speaks of cause in general, than to the
fundamental principle of this subject. The authority of the thing adjudged
is a bar to a new suit only to the extent that it bears exactly on what has
been decided by a prior judgment. Therefore, from the point of view which
we take, it Is necessary that it be founded on the same cause which was
made the object of the pleadings of the parties and on which the judge de-
cided after argument. Now, in the cases which we have just presented, the
judge had not decided on all the vices of form for which the testament
could be attacked, or on all the vices of consent for which the instrument
could be assailed, but only on the particular vice which the parties had sub-
mitted to his examination. Therefore there is nothing to preclude his proving,
in a second suit, the existence of another vice, that is to say another cause
of nullity. The new judgment could neither contradict nor confirm the first.
"Moreover, we should turn attention to the following point: as the judge
has the power to supply the simple means on his own motion, the nullity,
if one admits the doctrine of our adversaries, could be pronounced because
of a vice which the party has not urged. For example, if he has demanded
the annulment of a contract because of fraud, the court could annul this
contract because of violence.
"Thus the system of groups has a very grave defect in that it changes
the nature of the demand, by attributing to it a general character which it
does not have. The grouping of the vices, moreover, does not rest on any
principle. It is purely arbitrary."
See also 8 Dalloz, op. cit. supra note 26, at 294-295, no 198; Griolet, op.
cit. supra note 53, at 110-111; 8 Huc, op. cit. supra note 26, at 425, no 330.
64. 20 Laurent, op. cit. supra note 26, at 94-95, no 73. Cf. 3 Baudry-Lacan-
tinerie et Barde, loc. cit. supra note 63.
65. 20 Laurent, loc. cit. supra note 64.
66. 20 Laurent, op. cit. supra note 26, at 91-92, no 72.
67. 3 Baudry-Lacantinerie et Barde, op. cit. supra note 26, at 964-965, no
2681; 3 Garsonnet et Cdzar-Bru, op. cit. supra note 26, at 425-426, no 708; 8
Huc, op. cit. supra note 26, at 425-426, no 330; 20 Laurent, loc. cit. supra note
66; 2 Planiol, op. cit. supra note 26, at 24-25, no 54his 60.
68. Huc (8 Huc, op. cit. supra note 26, at 423-424, no 330) says that the
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A distinction is drawn between actions in nullity, based on
a cause which vitiates the right at the time of its origin, and
actions in resolution or revocation, which are based on causes
arising subsequent to the right.6 9 Therefore, failure in a suit for
the nullity of a contract for vices of consent cannot bar a second
action for its resolution on the ground of nonperformance of the
defendant's obligations."0 Furthermore, resolution or revocation
of the same contract, sale, or donation may be sought in succes-
sive suits for different causes: After losing a suit for resolution
of a sale on the allegation that the vendor is late in delivering
the thing sold, the vendee may sue for the resolution of the same
sale on the ground of impossibility of delivery.71
the Court of Cassation still adheres to the "grouping" system. 8 Huc, op. cit.
supra note 26, at 426, no 330; 2 Planiol, loc. cit. supra note 67. Cass., 13 avril
1869, Sirey, 1869.1.403. It is submitted, however, that the Court of Cassation
disregarded the "grouping" system in the arr~t of 20 octobre 1885, Sirey,
1889.1.23, and decided in accordance with the modern view.
69..3 Baudry-Lacantinerie et Barde, op. cit. supra note 26, at 966, no 2683;
8 Huc, op. cit. supra note 26, at 426, no 330. See also 12 Aubry et Rau, op. cit.
supra note 26, at 443 et seq.; Griolet, op. cit. supra note 53, at 113; 7 Larom-
biare, op. cit. supra note 26, at 95, no 79.
70. 3 Baudry-Lacantinerie et Barde, loc. cit. supra note 69; 8 Huc, loc.
cit. supra note 69; 7 Larombi~re, loc. cit. supra note 69; 2 Pothier, op. cit.
supra note 26, at 472, n. 2; 5 Toullier, op. cit. supra note 26, at 275, no 168.
Cf. Griolet, loc. cit. supra note 69. Cass., 5 novembre 1872, Sirey, 1873.1.198,
D.P., 1873.5.91. But see Cass., 31 janvier 1893, D.P., 1894.1.279.
71. Cass., 20 novembre 1834, Sirey, 1835.1.816. 7 Larombi~re, op. cit. supra
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Regarding the problem of choice of remedies, there has been
little practical difficulty. The hypothesis is commonly given: A
sells a movable to B, warranting it against redhibitory vices; such
vices having been revealed, B has a choice of two actions: the
redhibitory action, to rescind the sale and receive back the pur-
chase price, or the action quanti minoris, whereby he retains the
movable but sues for a diminution of price."' The commentators
are agreed that a suit for redhibition bars a subsequent suit for
diminution of price, although their theoretical explanations
vary.78 The specific problem presented in the hypothesis is un-
important in Louisiana, for this result is specified by Article 2543
of the Louisiana Civil Code. 4
The consideration in the last few pages has been entirely
from the viewpoint of a plaintiff who brings two successive suits;
the same rules are applicable, however, to the defendant, the
basis of whose defense is a cause.5 Apparently this applies both
to real and personal actions;0 at any rate, its applicability to the
note 26, at 97, no 80. See also 12 Aubry et Rau, op. cit. supra note 26, at 443
et seq. Cf. 5 Toullier, loc. cit. supra note 70.
72. Arts. 1641, 1644 French Civil Code; Laurent, op. cit. supra note 26,
at 109, no 81; 5 Toullier, op. cit. supra note 26, at 271, no 163. Cf. Arts. 2520,
2541, La. Civil Code of 1870.
73. There is but a single cause, from which two actions arise. 20 Laurent,
loc. cit. supra note 72; 2 Pothier, op. cit. supra note 26, at 475-476, no 898.
There is a single proximate cause, with two remote causes. 5 Toullier,
loc. cit. supra note 72.
These theories are criticized by Huc (8 Huc, op. cit. supra note 26, at
418-421, no 328), who says that the result is reached under Article 1644 of the
French Code, which is based on considerations peculiar to the situation.
74. "The purchaser who has contented himself with demanding a re-
duction of the price, can not afterwards maintain the redhibitory action.
"But In a redhibitory suit, the judge may decree merely a reduction of
the price." Art. 2543, La. Civil Code of 1870.
The same evidence is necessary to support a redhibitory action as an
action quantPminoris; the purchaser may choose between the two remedies.
Farmer v. Fisk, 9 Rob. 351 (La. 1844).
75. Cass., 18 mars 1863, Sirey, 1863.1.420; Cass., 14 novembre 1866, Sirey,
1867.L133; Cass., 20 janvier 1886, Sirey, 1889.1.224. Note that the definitions
of cause given by most of the commentators look to the exercise of rights
by defendants as well as by plaintiffs, some of them explicitly referring to
both actions and defenses. See supra, note 46. The definition of Huc (8 Huc,
op. cit. supra note 26, at 413, no 325) appears at first glance to be limited
in its application to actions brought by a plaintiff, but actually It also applies
to defendants. See infra, note 76.
"On observe, dans la pratique, que ce qui ddlimite Ie terrain sur lequel
a portd le premier litige eat trus souvent l'exception opposde par le defend-
eur, beaucoup plus que la demande formulae par le demandeur. Ainsi une
somme d'argent eat r6clamde d un d~biteur par son crdancier; Ie ddbiteur
se d6fend en opposant lexception de prescription; le debat va rouler sur une
question de prescription, et non pas sur toutes lea autres questions qu'o
peut se poser & loccasaon de cette erdance." 2 Planlol, op. cit. supra note
26, at 24, n. 3, no 54bis 6o.
(Translation) "It may be observed that in practice, the limitation of the
field which the first litigation has covered is very often made by the defense
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interposed by the defendant, much more than by the demand formulated
by the plaintiff. Thus a sum of money is claimed against a debtor by his
creditor; the debtor defends by interposing the exception of prescription;
the controversy is going to revolve on a question of prescription, and not
on all the other questions which could be set up by reason of this credit."
76. The commentators apparently consider this point either too obvious
or too unimportant for extended consideration. Most of them make no men-
tion whatever of the rules applicable to the defendant, other than to include
the bases of defenses in their definitions of cause. The principle stated Is
clearly established in the case of real actions, but the statements on per-
sonal actions are not as clear as might be desired.
Real Actions: 12 Aubry et Rau, op. cit. supra note 26, at 450, § 769; 8
Huc, op. cit. supra note 26, at 426, no 330; 7 Larombi~re, op. cit. supra note
26, at 80, no 68. Cass., 6 decembre 1837, Sirey, 1838.1.33 (action of partition);
Cass., 20 janvier 1886, Slrey, 1889.1.224 (succession proceeding).
Personal Actions: The passages from Aubry et Rau and Larombibre, just
cited, appear at first glance to be limited to real actions; but the immed-
iately prior consideration in each had led to the conclusion that the same
rules applied (to the plaintiff) in both personal and real actions. It would
seem, therefore, that the limiting words were used merely to make It clear
that this abrogation of the Roman restriction on real actions applies also
to defendants in real actions (as well as personal). Larombi~re continues
with broad language, apparently applicable to any kind of action, and con-
cludes that "the same rules apply to action and to defense." This construc-
tion Is further substantiated by the author's specific inclusion of defenses
in his consideration of certain personal actions (e.g., cf. 7 Larombibre, op.
cit. supra note 26, at 94, 97-98 no 78, 80).
The citation from Huc, supra, undoubtedly applies to personal actions; but
It is possible that he was referring to successive defenses by A to two suits
brought by B (e.g., suits for different years' interest on a note, In which A
attacks the validity of the note), and not to a case in which the defendant
in the first suit brings a second action to effect the recovery of the property
transferred by the first judgment. It is submitted, however, that the author
would have stated this limitation if he had intended his rule to apply re-
strictedly.
Defenses to real and personal actions are considered without distinction
by the author of note (1), Sirey, 1867.1.133; and it is clearly established that
the defendant in a real action may, after losing, sue to revendicate the prop-
erty on a ground which he might have urged in defense to the first suit
(see citations under "Real Actions," supra).
No case from the French courts has been discovered in which any dis-
tinction was drawn between real and personal actions, in this regard. In
Cass., 5 novembre 1872, Sirey, 1873.1.198, D.P., 1873.5.91, a suit by a lessor
against a bankrupt lessee, resulting in a judgment affirming the lease and
giving the plaintiff damages for rent past due and to become due to the
end of the lease, was held not to bar a subsequent suit in which the reso-
lution of the lease was decreed on the ground of inexecution of the lessor's
obligations, and the damages reduced to the amount of rent for the period
during which the premises were habitable. Also see: Cass., 14 novembre
1866, Sirey, 1867.1.133 (revocation of donation permitted on a ground which
might have been urged in defense to a prior suit, in which the donee secured
execution on property of the donor).
It would seem clear that defendants In personal actions are also ac-
corded the same privileges as plaintiffs, if it were not that the commentators
seem to imply, by affimative pregnant, that the defenses of payment and
remission cannot be urged after the judgment in the first suit unless the
defendant was ignorant of it, had forgotten about it, or did not have the
means of proof at the time of the suit on the debt. 3 Baudry-Lacantinerie
et Barde, op. cit. supra note 26, at 967-968, no 2684; 3 Garsonnet et C6zar-Bru,
op. cit. supra note 26, at 426-428, no 709; 8 Huc, op. cit. supra note 26, at 426-427,
no 331; 7 Larombibre, op. cit. supra note 26, at 167-170, no 162; 20 Laurent, op.
cit. supra note 26, at 187-189, no 154. This problem was discussed by the com-
mentators before the redaction of the Code, the difficulty arising from the
conflict between an old law requiring all peremptory exceptions (of which
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. II
former is well settled. Thus if A brings a petitory action against
B, who defends solely on the ground that he has prescribed the
land in controversy, a judgment for A will not prevent B's bring-
ing a second suit and proving that he had title by purchase from
C.77 But if the cause has actually been advanced by the defendant
in the first suit, new evidence (means) in support of the defense
will not serve as the basis of a new action.78
payment was one) to be pleaded before judgment in the first suit, and the
inequity of permitting a creditor to retain double payment. 9 Merlin, R~per-
toire Universel et Raisonn6 de Jurisprudence (4 ed. 1813), 142, no 14. The
more liberal view prevailed, and has in general been continued by the mod-
ern commentators, subject to the limitations stated above. (The three differ-
ing views of the commentators are summarized in 3 Garsonnet et C~zar-Bru,
loc. cit.) However, cf. Cass., 2 juillet 1861, Sirey, 1861.1.846, in which it was
held that a judgment recognizing a debt does not preclude the defendant's
subsequently showing that a remission had been granted, providing only
that this defense had not been advanced in the first suit; the court appar-
ently did not consider whether or not the defendant had the evidence of
discharge available at the time of the first action. Contra: Cass., 29 juillet
1851, Sirey, 1851.1.577, a decision which is criticized by A. Carette in a note
at the same citation.
This question would ordinarily be beyond the indicated scope of this
Comment, but, if the same rules are applicable to the defendant as to the
plaintiff in a personal action, why may not the defendant show payment
or remission in a subsequent suit even though he knew of the defense and
had the proof available at the time of the first suit? The question originally
arose from a specific rule of procedure which would necessarily except these
defenses from the operation of general principles (9 Merlin, loc. cit.); that
may well be the explanation under modern French law. (By way of analogy,
Louisiana procedure requires that peremptory exceptions be pleaded before
definitive judgment. Art. 346, La. Code of Practice of 1870. And payment has
been considered a peremptory exception. Gleises v. Faurie, 6 La. 455 (1834).)
From all of the above it may be seen that: 1) The defendant in a real
action may bring a separate suit on a cause which he might have urged in
defense to the first suit; 2) the defendant in a personal action can offer a
defense, to a subsequent suit on the same instrument, which he might have
advanced in the first; 3) apparently the defendant in a personal action can
bring a separate suit to effect the return of property transferred by the firstjudgment; 4) but if payment or remission is the defense which he failed to
urge, he apparently may not do so unless he had forgotten it, did not know
of it, or did not have the means of proof at the time of the first suit.
Procedure: It is obvious that the defendant who has been cast in a
petitory action can himself bring a petitory action, and therein advance the
title which he failed to urge in defense to the first suit. The remedy in the
case of actions other than those for the ownership of land is not so obvious;
but the usual device appears to be an action in quasi-contract, under Articles
1235 and 1376 of the French Civil Code (cf. Arts. 2133 and 2301, La. Civil
Code of 1870). 20 Laurent, loc. cit.; note by A. Carette, Sirey, 1851.1.577. Where
property has not yet been transferred under the first judgment, other devices
may be necessary: in the case of Cass., 14 novembre 1866 (supra), the donor
sued for "the revocation of the said donation ... and consequently the annul-
ment of the seizure" under the first judgment.
77. 12 Aubry et Rau, loc. cit. supra note 76; 3 Garsonnet et Cgzar-Bru,
op. cit. supra note 26, at 411, no 703; 7 Larombi~re, op. cit. supra note 26, at
80, no 68; Cass., 6 d~cembre 1837, Sirey, 1838.1.33.
Contrast this result with that of the common law, supra, p. 352 and note 32.
78. 12 Aubry et Rau, loc. cit. supra note 76; 7 Larombi~re, loc. cit. supra
note 77, and at 163, no 159. Note (1), Sirey, 1867.1.133. Cass., 29 juillet 1851,
Sirey, 1851.1.577; Cass., 7 mai 1861, Sirey, 1861.1.704; Cass., 18 mars 1863, Sirey,
1863.1.420.
COMMENTS
The authority of the thing adjudged attaches only to the
dispositif of the judgment (the actual decision), and not to the
motifs (reasons for the decision) ;79 and it applies only to those
parts of the dispositif as have actually been submitted to the
court by the parties, and decided by the judgnent. 0 Hence a
judgment granting alimony to a plaintiff, on the ground that he
is the defendant's child, does not conclude the question of the
plaintiff's filiation unless this issue was raised and actually liti-
gated by the parties.81 To determine this, the dispositif is inter-
preted by reference to the pleadings 2 in the case.83 Whenever
the application of res judicata is doubtful, the exception should
be rejected."'
PRELIMINARY SUMMARY
Before entering into a consideration of the Louisiana cases,
it may be well to summarize briefly the more notable differences
between the common law and the French law of res judicata.
I. Common law.
A. Where the cause of action is the same in the two suits,
1. The prior judgment is decisive of all matters or is-
sues which
a) The plaintiff urged or might have urged in sup-
port thereof, or
b) The defendant raised or might have raised in de-
fense thereto;
79. 12 Aubry et Rau, op. cit. supra note 26, at 402 et seq., § 769 I 2e; 3
Baudry-Lacantinerie et Barde, op. cit. supra note 26, at 956-957, no 2672; 8
Dalloz, op. cit. supra note 26, at 219-220, no 24; 2 Garsonnet et Czar-Bru, op.
cit. supra note 26, at 408-411, no 703; 7 Larombi~re, op. cit. supra note 26, at
36-37, no 18; 20 Laurent, op, cit. supra note 26, at 40 et seq., no 29 et seq. Cass.,
10 f~vrier 1891, Sirey, 1891.1.248; Douai, 28 avril 1874, D.P., 1875.2.49; Grenoble,
22 juillet 1880, D.P., 1881.2.177. But cf. 8 Huc, op. cit. supra note 26, at 393-396,
no 310.
80. 3 Baudry-Lacantinerie et Barde, op. cit. supra note 26, at 957-958, no
2673; 7 Larombi~re, op. cit. supra note 26, at 48-49; no 29; 20 Laurent, op. cit.
supra note 26, at 43-45, no 32.
81. 7 Larombire, loc. cit. supra note 80; 20 Laurent, loc. cit. supra note
80.
82. "Pleadings" is adopted for the translation of "'conclusions."
83. 3 Baudry-Lacantinerie et Barde, loc. cit. supra note 26, at 956-957, no
2672; 7 Larombire, op. cit. supra note 26, at 49-50, no 30; 20 Laurent, op. cit.
supra note 26, at 51, no 37. Cf. Saul v. His Creditors, 7 Mart. (N.S.) 425 (La.
1829). A few cases at common law hold that a former judgment cannot be
an estoppel as to a fact which was not in issue on the face of the pleadings.
Towns v. Nims, 5 N.H. 259, 20 Am. Dec. 578 (1830); see cases from Connecti-
cut, Indiana, Iowa, New Hampshire, and England collected in 34 C.J. (1924)
921, n. 74.
84. 8 Dalloz, op. cit. supra note 26, at 348-349, no 293; 7 Larombire, op.
cit. supra note 26, at 163, no 158; 20 Laurent, op. cit. supra note 26, at 164,
no 131; 5 Toullier, op. cit. supra note 26, at 268, no 157.
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2. But, in addition to there being identity of cause of
action, there usually must be identity in the thing
sued for and in the parties and the qualities in which
they appear.
B. Where the cause of action is different in the two suits,
1. The judgment is an estoppel only as to issues actually
adjudicated (expressly or by necessary implication)
in the prior action;
2. But the estoppel extends to matters which might have
been, but were not, urged in support of or against
these issues.
3. The identities of cause of action and thing demanded
are replaced by the requirement that the issues be
the same.
II. French law.
A. The identities of cause, object, parties, and qualities are
required in every instance (Article 1351, French Civil
Code).
B. Therefore, since there must always be identity of cause
and object (thing demanded), there can be no exact
counterpart of the common law estoppel by judgment.
1. But, since cause is sufficiently broad to include the
bases of defenses, the same results are attained in
many instances without violating the requirements
of Article 1351 (provided always that the object is the
same).
C. In general, it may be said that no matters except those
of evidentiary nature are concluded by a judgment,
unless they were actually submitted to the decision of
the court.
The following differences in results should be particularly
noticed:
a) In actions for the ownership of land, the common law
(under the doctrine of estoppel by judgment) requires that the
plaintiff cumulate all his claims in one suit, for the judgment
will be conclusive of all claims which might have supported the
issue of title, whether they were urged or not. The French law,
on the contrary, permits a separate suit on each sale, on each
right of inheritance, each donation, each exchange.
b) Similarly, the common law requires the defendant in
such a suit to advance all his defenses; if he has a claim of owner-
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ship which he does not advance, it is forever lost to him. The
French permit him to defend on one claim of title in the first
suit, and should he lose, he may sue on whatever other claims he
many have.
c) One who attacks the validity of a written instrument is
required by the common law to advance all his grounds of in-
validity in one suit;85 in France, this view has been adopted by
only two obscure commentators, one of whom subsequently
abandoned it.86 The modern view in France permits a separate
suit or defense on each vice, and even the view which formerly
prevailed was much more liberal than the common law.
CLAUDE O'QUIN
[This Comment will be concluded in a forthcoming issue of
the LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW, with a discussion of the Louisiana
jurisprudence.]
REMISSION IN THE CIVIL LAW
LOUISIANA CIVIL CODE OF 1870:
ART. 2100. The creditor, who consents to the division of
the debt with regard to one of the codebtors, still has an ac-
tion in solido against the others, but under the deduction of
the part of the debtor whom he has discharged from the debt
in solido.
ART. 2101. The creditor, who receives separately the part
of one of the debtors, without reserving in the receipt the debt
in solido or his right in general, renounces the debt in solido,
only with regard to that debtor.
The creditor is not deemed to remit the debt in solido to
the debtor when he receives from him a sum equal to the
portion due by him, unless the receipt specifies that it is for
his part.
The same is to be observed of the mere demand made of
one of the codebtors, for his part, if the latter has not ac-
quiesced in the demand or if a judgment has not been given
against him.
ART. 2203. The remission or conventional discharge in
favor of one of the codebtors in solido, discharges all the
85. It is not clear whether this is on the basis of res judicata as a bar,
or estoppel by judgment; see supra, note 33.
86. See note 53, supra.
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